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Abstract. Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a method for pro-
viding integrity and authenticity assurances on the message by allowing
the receiver to detect any changes to the message content. In this paper,
we present a generic MAC named InterCW-MAC which can prevent re-
play attack and can deal with a untrusted receiver who may search the
secret keys of the sender.
Keywords: Message Authentication Code, Homomorphic Message Au-
thentication Code, InterMAC, Carter-Wegman MAC
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which a sender owns a message M and wants to send M
to a receiver. Because M can be modified or loss during being transmitted, the
receiver would like to check whether M is intact or not. A MAC is proposed
to provide integrity and authenticity assurances on the message by allowing
the receiver (who also possess the shared secret key of the sender) to detect
any changes to the message content. A MAC consists of a tuple of algorithms
(KeyGen, Tag, Verify) as follows:
– KeyGen(1λ) → k: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs a security
parameter λ, and outputs a secret key k. The sender then sends k to the
receiver via a secure channel.
– Tag(M,k)→ t: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs k and a message
M , and outputs a tag t.
– Verify(M, t, k)→ {0, 1}: The receiver runs this algorithm which inputs M , t
and k, and outputs 1 if t is a valid tag and 0 otherwise.
Definition 1. A MAC is an additive homomorphic MAC if it satisfies:
Tag(M1, k) + Tag(M2, k) = Tag(M1 +M2, k) (1)
Definition 2. A MAC is a multiplicative homomorphic MAC if it satisfies:
Tag(M1, k) · Tag(M2, k) = Tag(M1 ·M2, k) (2)
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1.1 Inner-product MAC
The simplest additive MAC is the inner-product MAC. This MAC consists of
the following algorithms:
– KeyGen(1λ)→ k: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs a security pa-
rameter λ, and outputs a secret key k ∈ Fξq where F
ξ
q denotes a ξ-dimensional
finite field F of a prime order q. The sender then shares k to the receiver via
a secure channel.
– Tag(M,k) → t: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs k ∈ Fξq and a
message M ∈ Fξq, and outputs a tag t such that:
t = M · k ∈ Fq (3)
The sender then transmits {M, t} to the receiver.
– Verify(M, t, k)→ {0, 1}: The receiver runs this algorithmwhich inputs {M, t, k}
and checks if:
t
?
=M · k (4)
The algorithms outputs 1 if the equality holds (t is a valid tag) and outputs
0 otherwise.
Theorem 1. The inner-product MAC is a additive homomorphic MAC.
Proof. – Tag(M1, k) = M1 · k
– Tag(M2, k) =M2 · k
– Tag(M1, k) + Tag(M2, k) = (M1 +M2) · k = Tag(M1 +M2, k) ⊓⊔
Security Analysis. The inner-product MAC is secured from the brute forge
search if p is chosen large enough. This is because k ∈ Fξq, the probability to find
k via a brute force search is 1/qξ. If q is chosen large enough (i.e., 160 bits), the
probability is 1/(2160)ξ, which is negligible.
However, this MAC is not secured from the replay attack because:
– In the first transmission:
• The sender sends {M, t =M · k} to the receiver.
• The attacker captures M and t when they are transmitted.
• The receiver verifies iff: t = M · k. Suppose that the equality holds (M
is intact), the receiver then outputs 1.
– In the next transmission:
• The sender sends {M ′, t′ = M ′ · k} to the receiver.
• The attacker re-uses the old message M and the old tag t. It is clear
that:
t
M
=
t′
M ′
(5)
• The attacker drops {M ′, t′} and sends {M, t} to the receiver.
• The receiver verifies iff: t = M · k. This equality will hold because of Eq.
5 but the receiver cannot know that the message was replaced.
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1.2 Carter-Wegman MAC
To address replay attack which is a drawback of the inner-product MAC, the
Wegman-Carten MAC [1,3] has been proposed with an additional pseudorandom
function. This MAC consists of the following algorithms:
– KeyGen(1λ)→ {k, k′}: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs a secu-
rity parameter λ, and outputs a secret key k ∈ Fξq which is used for tagging
the message M ∈ Fξq, a secret key k
′ ∈ K′ which is used for permuting the
tag. After that, the sender shares {k, k′} to the receiver via a secure channel.
– Tag(M,k, k′)→ t: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs the message
M and {k, k′}, and outputs a tag t such that:
t = M · k + fk′(r) ∈ Fq (6)
where r denotes a random value and f denotes a pseudorandom function
such that f : K′ ×R → Fq (K
′ is the space of k′ and R is the space of r).
The sender then transmits {M, t} to the receiver. Note that (i) f can be
public, and (ii) r is re-generated very transmission and is transmitted to the
receiver via a secure channel like the keys (or is chosen large enough).
– Verify(M, t, k, k′, r, f) → {0, 1}: The receiver runs this algorithm which in-
puts {M, t, k, k′, r, f} and checks if:
t
?
=M · k + fk′(r) (7)
The algorithm outputs 1 if the equality holds (t is a valid tag), and outputs
0 otherwise.
Security Analysis. Similar to the inner-product MAC, the keys of the Wegman-
Carten MAC is not disclosed from the brute force search if q and K′ are chosen
large enough. Furthermore, the Wegman-Carten MAC is secured from the replay
attack:
– In the first transmission:
• The sender sends {M, t =M · k + fk′(r)} to the receiver.
• The attacker captures M and t when they are transmitted.
• The receiver verifies iff: t = M · k + fk′(r). Suppose that the equality
holds (which means that M is intact), the receiver then outputs 1.
– In the next transmission:
• The sender sends {M ′, t′ = M ′ · k + fk′(r
′)} to the receiver.
• The attacker re-uses the old message M and the old tag t. It is clear
that:
t
M
6=
t′
M ′
(8)
• The attacker drops {M ′, t′} and sends {M, t} to the receiver.
• The receiver verifies iff: t = M · k. This equality will not hold because of
Eq. 8. The receiver then outputs 0.
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1.3 Inter MAC
Most of the MACs consider a scenario in which the sender sends a message along
with the corresponding tag to the receiver. The receiver can check whether the
message is intact using a shared key with the sender. However, the receiver can
be untrusted (the sender should not share his/her secret key to the receiver). To
address this problem, the inter MAC has been proposed [2,4,7,11,12] as follows:
– KeyGen(1λ,M) → {k, k′}: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs a
security parameter λ and a message M ∈ Fξq, and outputs secret keys {k ∈
F
ξ
q, k
′ ∈ Fξq} where M · k
′ = 0. The sender then computes k′′ = k + k′, and
sends k′′ to the receiver.
– Tag(M,k) → t: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs the message
M ∈ Fξq and the secret key k ∈ F
ξ
q, and outputs a tag t such that:
t = M · k ∈ Fq (9)
The sender then transmits {M, t} to the receiver.
– Verify(M, t, k′′) → {0, 1}: The receiver runs this algorithm which inputs
{M, t, k′′} and checks if:
t
?
= M · (k + k′) (10)
The algorithm outputs 1 if the equality holds (t is a valid tag) and outputs
0 otherwise.
Theorem 2. The inter MAC is a additive homomorphic MAC.
Proof. – Tag(M1, k + k
′) =M1 · (k + k
′)
– Tag(M2, k + k
′) = M2 · (k + k
′)
– Tag(M1, k+k
′)+Tag(M2, k+k
′) = (M1+M2)·(k+k
′) = Tag(M1+M2, k+k
′)
⊓⊔
Security Analysis. Given k′′, which is the summation (k + k′), the receiver
cannot obtain the secret keys k and k′ of the sender. This is because k, k′ ∈ Fξq,
the probability for an attacker to search k (or k′) via a brute force search and
then to obtain k′ = k′′ − k (or k = k′′ − k′) is 1/qξ. If q is chosen large enough
(i.e., 160 bits), the probability to find k and k′ is 1/2160, which is negligible.
However, similar to the inner-product MAC, this inter MAC cannot be secured
from replay attack.
2 The Proposed InterCW-MAC
The InterCW-MAC is a combination between the Carter-Wegman MAC and
the inter MAC. The InterCW-MAC is proposed to deal with two problems of
the Carter-Wegman MAC and the inter MAC: preventing the replay attack and
preventing the untrusted receiver to learn the secret key of the sender.
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2.1 Construction
The InterCW-MAC consists of the following algorithms:
– KeyGen(1λ,M)→ {k1, k
′
1, k2}: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs
a security parameter λ, and outputs a secret key k1, k
′
1 ∈ F
ξ
q which is used
for tagging the message M , and a key k2 ∈ K
′ which is used for permuting
the tag. The sender then computes k′′1 = k1 + k
′
1. The sender sends k
′′
1 and
k2 to the receiver via a secure channel.
– Tag(M,k1, k2)→ t: The sender runs this algorithm which inputs a message
M and {k1, k2}, and outputs a tag t such that:
t =M · k1 + fk2(r) ∈ Fq (11)
where r denotes a random value and f denotes a pseudorandom function
such that f : K′ ×R → Fq (K
′ is the space of k′ and R is the space of r).
The sender then transmits {M, t} to the receiver. Note that (i) f can be
public, and (ii) r is re-generated very transmission and is transmitted to the
receiver via a secure channel like the keys (or is chosen large enough).
– Verify(M, t, k′′1 , k2, r, f) → {0, 1}: The receiver runs this algorithm which
inputs {M, t, k′′1 , k2, r, f} and checks if:
t
?
= M · k′′1 + fk2(r) (12)
The algorithm outputs 1 if the equality holds (t is a valid tag), and outputs
0 otherwise.
2.2 Application of InterCW-MAC
We believe the InterCW-MAC can be applied in several scenarios. In this sec-
tion, we describe an application of the InterCW-MAC in network coding-based
distributed storage system.
Network coding-based distributed storage system. Network coding has
been applied to distributed storage system [5,6,8,9]. In this scenario, the system
model consists of two types of entities: a client (trusted) and servers (untrusted).
Suppose that a client owns an original file F which consists of m file blocks: F =
v1|| · · · ||vm. vi ∈ F
ξ
q where i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. The client wants to store redundantly
encoded blocks in the servers in a way that the client can reconstructs the original
file F and can repair the encoded blocks in a corrupted server. From these file
blocks, the client firstly creates m augmented blocks {w1, · · · , wm} in which
wi ∈ F
ξ+m
q where i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} has the form as follows:
wi = (vi,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Fξ+mq (13)
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The client then randomly chooses m coding coefficients α1, · · · , αm
rand
← Fq
and computes coded blocks using the linear combination as follows:
c =
m∑
i=1
αi · wi ∈ F
ξ+m
q (14)
The coded blocks are then stored these coded blocks in the servers. To recon-
struct the original file F , any m coded blocks are required to solve m augmented
blocks w1, · · · , wm using the accumulated coefficients contained in the last m
coordinates of each coded block. After these m augmented blocks are solved, m
file blocks v1, · · · , vm are obtained from the first coordinate of each augmented
block. Finally, the original file F is reconstructed by concatenating the file blocks.
Note that the matrix consisting of the coefficients used to construct anym coded
blocks should have full rank. Koetter et al. [10] proved that if the prime q is cho-
sen large enough and the coefficients are chosen randomly, the probability for
the matrix having full rank is high.
Checking the data stored in the servers. Because the servers may be
untrusted, the client must check the servers periodically to ensure that his/her
data stored in the servers is always available and intact. In this case, the client
can use the same secret keys to tag and to verify.
However, when the client does not want to be burdened in checking the
servers periodically, the client can delegate this task to another entity called
third party verifier (verifier for short), which may be also untrusted. This entity
is supposed to not collude with the servers. To deal with this scenario, we can
apply the InterCW-MAC.
How to apply InterCW-MAC. The InterCW-MAC can be applied to the
above scenario as follows:
a) KeyGen(1λ, {w1, · · · , wm}) → {k1, k
′
1, k2}: The client runs this algorithm
which inputs a security parameter λ and the set ofm augmented blocks {w1, · · · , wm},
and outputs secret keys {k1, k2} as follows:
– k1, k2
rand
← Fξ+mq .
– k′1 ∈ F
ξ+m
q such that wi · k
′
1 = 0 for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
The client then computes k′′1 = k1 + k
′
1. The client sends k
′′
1 and k2 to the
verifier.
The KeyGen introduces a challenge that how to generate k′1 such that it is
orthogonal to allm augmented blocks. Formally, k′1 ·wi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
The algorithm to generate k′ is given as follows.
– OrthogonalGen–SS (w1, · · · , wm) → k
′
1:
• Find the span pi of w1, · · · , wm ∈ F
ξ+m
q .
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• Construct the matrix M in which {w1, · · · , wm} are the rows of M .
• Find the null-space of M , denoted by pi⊥M , which is the set of all vectors
u ∈ Fξ+mq such that M · u
T = 0.
• Find the basis vectors of pi⊥M , denoted by b1, · · · , bξ ∈ F
ξ+m
q // Theorem
3 will explain why the number of the basis vectors is ξ.
• Let B = {b1, · · · , bξ}
• Compute k′1 ← Kg–SS(B).
– Kg(B = {b1, · · · , bξ})→ k
′: this is the sub-algorithm used inOrthogonalGen–SS
• Let f be a Pseudorandom function such that K × [1, ξ]→ Fq.
• Generate rx ← f(kPRF , x) ∈ Fq, ∀x ∈ {1, · · · , z} where kPRF ∈ K.
• Compute k′1 ←
∑z
x=1 rx · bx ∈ F
ξ+m
q .
Theorem 3. Given {w1, · · · , wm} ∈ F
ξ+m
q , the number of basis vectors of pi
⊥
M
is ξ.
Proof. rank(M) = m. Let piM be the space spanned by the rows of M . For any
m× (ξ +m) matrix, the rank-nullity theorem gives:
rank(M) + nullity(M) = ξ +m (15)
where nullity(M) is the dimension of pi⊥M . Therefore,
dim(pi⊥M ) = (ξ +m)−m = ξ (16)
In other words, the number of basis vectors of pi⊥M is ξ. In the OrthogonalGen,
we denoted the basis vectors by {b1, · · · , bξ}. ⊓⊔
b) Tag(cuv, k1, k2) → {t1, · · · , tm}: The client runs this algorithm which inputs
cuv and {k1, k2} where cuv is the v-th coded block in the u-th server. cuv is
computed as a linear combination of {w1, · · · , wm} using network coding: cuv =∑m
i=1 αiwi. The algorithm outputs the tag tuv for cuv such that:
tuv = cuv · k1 + fk2(u||v) ∈ Fq (17)
for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. u denotes the server index and v denotes the coded block
index in a server. Suppose the number of servers is n (u ∈ {1, · · · , n}). Suppose
the number of coded block in a server is d (v ∈ {1, · · · , d}).
c) Verify(cSu , tSu , k
′′
1 , k2, Su)→ {0, 1}: The verifier runs this algorithm to check
a server Su where u ∈ {1, · · · , n}. The algorithm inputs {cSu , tSu , k
′′
1 , k2} where
cSu and tSu are the linear combinations of {cu1, · · · , cud} and {tu1, · · · , tud},
respectively. Namely, cSu =
∑d
v=1 βuvcuv and tSu =
∑d
v=1 βuvtuv. The algorithm
checks if:
tSu
?
= cSu · k
′′
1 +
d∑
v=1
βuvfk2(u||v) (18)
This algorithm outputs 1 if the equality holds (Su is healthy), and outputs 0
otherwise.
The correctness of Eq. 18 is proved as follows:
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Proof.
tSu =
∑d
v=1 βuvtuv
=
∑d
v=1 βuv(cuvk1 + fk2(u||v))
=
∑d
v=1 βuvcuvk1 +
∑d
v=1 βuvfk2(u||v)
=
∑d
v=1
∑m
i=1 βuvαiwik1 +
∑d
v=1 βuvfk2(u||v)
=
∑d
v=1
∑m
i=1 βuvαiwi(k1 + k
′
1) +
∑d
v=1 βuvfk2(u||v) // because wik
′
1 = 0
=
∑d
v=1 βuvcuv(k1 + k
′
1) +
∑d
v=1 βuvfk2(u||v)
= cSu(k1 + k
′
1) +
∑d
v=1 βuvfk2(u||v)
⊓⊔
3 Future work
In the proposed InterCW-MAC, the verifier is given k′′ = k1 + k
′
1 ∈ F
ξ+m
q and
k2 ∈ F
ξ+m
q . The probability for the verifier to search each secret key k1, k2 is
1/qξ+m. This probability can be reduced if the verifier is given k′′ = k1 + k
′
1 ∈
F
ξ+m
q and k
′′
2 = k2 + k
′
2 ∈ F
ξ+m
q . For future work, a potential solution is to
design a pseudo-random function f2 such that it is homomorphic (to suit network
coding) and such that given f2, k2 and k
′
2 cannot be obtained.
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